At some point during the 1950s, mainstream American philosophy of science began increasingly to avoid questions about the role of non-cognitive values in science and, accordingly, increasingly to avoid active engagement with social, political and moral concerns. Such questions and engagement eventually ceased to be part of the mainstream. Here we show that the eventual dominance of 'valuefree' philosophy of science can be attributed, at least in part, to the policies of the U.S. National Science Foundation's "History and Philosophy of Science" sub-program. In turn, the sub-program's policies were set by logical empiricists who espoused value-free philosophy of science; these philosophers' actions, we also point out, fit a broad pattern, one in which analytic philosophers used institutional control to marginalize rival approaches to philosophy. We go on to draw on existing knowledge of this pattern to suggest two further, similar, contributors to the withdrawal from valueladen philosophy of science, namely decisions by the editors of Philosophy of Science and by the editors of The Journal of Philosophy. Political climate was, we argue, at most an indirect contributor to the withdrawal and was neither a factor that decided whether it occurred nor one that was sufficient to bring it about. Moreover, we argue that the actions at the National Science Foundation went beyond what was required by its senior administrators and are better viewed as part of what drove, rather than as what was being driven by, the adoption of logical empiricism by the philosophy of science community.
Introduction
It was, prior to the 1950s, standard for American philosophers of science to deal with matters of political ideology and science policy, and to address, more generally, questions about the role of noncognitive values in science (Howard 2003; Douglas 2009 Douglas , 2012 Cartieri and Potochnik 2014) . At some point during the 1950s, however, this societally engaged philosophy of science started to lose its prominence; indeed, it eventually ceased to be part of the mainstream. Here we provide evidence 3 for thinking that this change was, at least in part, due to decisions at the "History and Philosophy of Science" (HPS) sub-program of the U.S. National Science Foundation's (NSF's) Social Science program. These decisions were made by philosophers of science who (a) were committed to valuefree approaches to the philosophy of science (i.e., approaches according to which the philosophy of science should not deal with non-cognitive values except in logically analyzing value-laden terms that have a role in the context of justification) and (b) favored value-free approaches at the expense of value-laden ones (i.e., at the expense of approaches according to which the philosophy of science should deal with non-cognitive values in a descriptive and/or normative way). We also situate our account of the impact of the HPS sub-program within a broader one about the growing dominance of analytic philosophy.
We start, in section 2, by clarifying the 1950s and early 1960s distinction between value-free and value-laden philosophies of science, and by presenting the logical empiricist philosophy behind the distinction. This material will inform our analysis of NSF projects as well as of the views of the philosophers who influenced NSF funding allocation. We then, in section 3, describe and summarize the funding decisions made in the first six years of the HPS sub-program (1958 HPS sub-program ( -1963 . Virtually all the philosophical work that received support from the NSF conformed to the value-free ideal as it was then understood. In section 4, we argue that this ideal, and the logical empiricist philosophy behind it, was endorsed by the philosophers of science who were involved as advisors in the subprogram. Moreover, these philosophers were, to a considerable extent, responsible for the pattern observed in the funding records; philosophers who were committed to value-free approaches seem to have used institutional control to promote work that fitted their own standards. This is indicated by the fact that they had the discretionary power to grant funding, probably could have done otherwise (i.e., direct funds to individuals within the still significant pool of philosophers who engaged in valueladen philosophy of science) and were affiliated with analytic philosophy, which had (Katzav 2018 , Katzav and Vaesen 2017a , Katzav and Vaesen 2017b ) a track record of using institutional control to reduce institutional diversity. Section 5 suggests that the use of institutional control at the NSF was, 4 due to the push funding gives to research careers and due to the NSF's prominence, an important cause of philosophy of science's withdrawal from social concerns. The resulting HPS policies were themselves, of course, also part of the withdrawal. Additional contributing factors that we identify, and that belong to analytic philosophy's track record, are the marginalization of value-laden philosophy of science at the journal Philosophy of Science and of pragmatism at The Journal of Philosophy. Furthermore, we assess our story in terms of other factors that have been claimed to explain the withdrawal. While some (Edgar 2009 ) have taken it to have been, to a substantial extent, an effect of the adoption of logical empiricism by the philosophy of science community in America, we suggest that the adoption of logical empiricism and the withdrawal are better thought of as being driven by the actions and views of a portion of this community. We acknowledge that McCarthyite pressures (McCumber 2001 (McCumber , 2016 Reisch 2005) and, more broadly, conservative politics, may well have been factors in encouraging value-free philosophy of science, including in encouraging the HPS sub-program's promotion of such philosophy of science. We do argue, however, that conservative politics was, at most, an indirect factor in bringing about the exclusion of value-laden philosophy of science from mainstream philosophy of science and was neither a decisive factor in doing somarginalization would have occurred anyway -nor one that, by itself, sufficed to do so. And we point out that Solovey's account (2013) , according to which NSF administrators were primarily responsible for promoting the value-free ideal, overlooks the role played by philosophers in achieving that ideal in the philosophy of science. Section 6 considers how our study furthers the understanding of the use of institutional control in the promotion of analytic philosophy, as well as points to some unanswered questions about the development of philosophy of science.
Value-free and value-laden philosophies of science, 1950s to early 1960s
Our characterization of the value-free ideal is taken primarily from Reichenbach's The Rise of Scientific Philosophy (1951) . It provides the most influential 1950s statement of the view that philosophy of science should be value-free (McCumber 2016, p. 57 ).
Reichenbach's commitment to value-free philosophy of science was part of his broader logical empiricist philosophy of science. On Reichenbach's version of logical empiricism, knowledge comes in two forms (Reichenbach 1951, p. 276) ; it is of analytic or of synthetic truths. Synthetic truths concern matters of fact, and are established by the empirical sciences. Analytic truths are empty and are not established empirically (ibid., p. 17 & pp. 221-222) . Now, according to Reichenbach, "philosophy is logical analysis of all forms of human thought" (ibid., p. 308; see also p. 105), where logical analysis is the clarification of meaning by uncovering logical relations between expressions (ibid., p. 123, Reichenbach 1949, p. 293) , and hence by uncovering analytic truths. Philosophy of science, in turn, should focus on the logical analysis of science (1951, p. 123) . More specifically, philosophy of science's analyses must, according to Reichenbach, pertain to the context of justification (i.e., to "the relation between given facts and […] theory", ibid., p. 231); it is not the philosopher's task to account for the context of discovery, since the act of discovery eludes logical analysis (ibid., p. 231).
The restriction that philosophers be concerned with the establishment of analytic truths means that they should not engage in descriptive ethics. For descriptive ethics informs us (i.e., provides synthetic claims) about social matters of fact, e.g., our ethical habits, and is thus part of sociology rather than of philosophy (ibid., pp. 276-277) . Furthermore, the restriction also excludes philosophers from the domain of normative ethics. Ethics can tell us what, for instance, the term "virtuous man" means, but not whether one ought to be virtuous (ibid., p. 277). More generally, a focus solely on analytic truths means that philosophers of science should neither carry out descriptive research, including descriptive research into non-cognitive matters, nor be prescriptive.
1 Note that Reichenbach acknowledges that scientific reasoning requires volitional decisions that are not based on cognitive values. However, philosophers of science should not advise the scientist which decisions to take; all 6 they should do, as philosophers of science, is to construct a list of all possible decisions and to point out, by means of logical analysis, the logical implications of each decision (1951, pp. 321-323) .
In sum, what Reichenbach's logical empiricism tells us about philosophers of science and noncognitive values is that philosophers of science should not, neither in a descriptive nor in a normative manner, deal with non-cognitive values. Approaches that meet these conditions will, in the remainder, be referred to as value-free approaches.
Reichenbach's approach to philosophy of science (like the approaches of most of the other players in our further story, see Section 4) excludes several approaches to philosophy of science that explicitly dealt with non-cognitive values in a descriptive and/or normative way (value-laden approaches in short). It is, for instance, at odds with approaches that aimed at the empirical description of the normative and non-normative conditions of knowledge, including of scientific knowledge (Lavine 1950) . It is also at odds with approaches that aim to develop a descriptive, scientific ethics, based on biological knowledge (Gerard 1942) , and with approaches that attempt to derive normative moral principles from such knowledge (Bachem 1958) . It is incompatible with Deweyan approaches according to which ethical inquiry must be scientific, and just like scientific inquiry, results in recommendations as to how best to address concrete, problematic situations (Mesthene 1947) . In particular, such approaches conflict with Reichenbach's insistence that the task of ethics is to analyze, not to provide, moral advice. Further, Reichenbach's value-free ideal excludes investigation of valueladen topics that belong to the context of discovery. So it excludes descriptive accounts of, e.g., the social functions of science (Hartung 1947 ) and the effects of publication practices on the functioning of science (Sjoberg 1956 ); and it excludes accounts that offer advice, e.g., regarding the contributions that social scientists ought to make to social policy (Shils 1949) , and regarding the ways in which basic research should be supported (Shepard 1956 ). Finally, the value-free ideal considers illegitimate approaches that are explicitly political, e.g., approaches engaging with Marxism (Feuer 1949; Ballard 1955; Riepe 1958 Table 1 gives an overview of the grants awarded in this program to projects in the philosophy of science. The titles of three of the projects (viz. the projects by Edel, Burks and Beckner) are ambiguous with respect to compatibility with the value-free ideal, as they include terms (viz., "social", "reason", "psychology") that we also see appearing in prominent value-laden work (e.g., Shils 1949 , Shepard 1956 , Feuer 1963 , Harris 1969 . 3 The titles of the remaining twenty-nine projects, however, indicate that these projects are legitimate according to the ideal. Looking at the content of the work published by the awardees also suggests that the vast majority of the research projects supported by the HPS sub-program were value-free. From a total of 239 publications which are recorded in the Philosopher's Index and were produced by the awardees within five years after they received their grant, 48 contain (in their title, abstract or keywords) terms that feature prominently in value-laden work (see footnote 3), and thus, that suggest they might violate the value-free ideal. 18 of the 48 publications are, however, irrelevant to the present discussion, since they do not concern the philosophy of science. 4 Moreover, 24 of the remaining 30 publications are consistent with the value-free ideal. More specifically, they include 7 papers in logic, 5 9 publications containing value-free discussions of induction, justification, confirmation, explanation and/or prediction, 6 an edited volume concerning concepts, theories and the mind-body problem, 7 a book defending the view that the evaluation of scientific theories is value-free, 8 a conceptual inquiry into innate ideas, 9 a paper criticizing the view that the fruits of scientific inquiry are to be evaluated by 10 taking into account practical concerns, 10 a satirical piece by Feigl regarding on-going discussions about the nature of value judgment, 11 another paper by Feigl in which he criticizes modernized theology 12 , a paper on the measurability of economic terms, 13 and a favourable review of Herbert
Simon's mathematical essays on rational human behavior. 14 Only 6 (from a total of 239) publications pursue an approach that violates the value-free ideal. One of these is an empirical study of value change by Rescher. 15 The rest are authored by Edel, and deal with the development of a scientifically informed descriptive and normative ethics.
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A closer examination of the publications by awardees who, apart from Edel, were hard to classify based on the titles of their projects, suggests that only Arthur W. Burks, in his engagement with the work of Peirce, wrote on topics that belie the value-free ideal (e.g., Burks, 1943 Burks, , 1958 . However, the book that Burks devotes to the research for which he was awarded an NSF grant is a technical and value-free inquiry into the nature of scientific evidence (Burks 1977) .
A similar pattern emerges when we consider the work published by scholars who were awarded a graduate or postdoctoral fellowship by the NSF. The Philosopher's Index documents 43 publications written by graduate students in the ten years after they obtained their award, and 12 publications written by postdoctoral fellows in the five years after they obtained their award. 17 From these 55 publications, only 7 pass the search filter detailed above. None of the 7, however, conflicts with the 10 I.e., Levi 1964. 11 I.e., Feigl 1964. 12 I.e., Feigl 1963. 13 I.e., Rescher 1966e.
14 I.e., Adams 1962. 15 I.e., Rescher 1967c. 16 I.e., Edel 1959c Edel , 1960 Edel , 1961b Edel , 1963b Edel , 1963c value-free ideal. One paper is a contribution to political philosophy rather than to the philosophy of science, 18 and five papers are concerned with logic. 19 The seventh contribution is a textbook, authored by Richard Rudner, concerning the philosophy of social science (1966) . According to Rudner, the philosophy of science is concerned with methodological issues (1966, p. 3) and methodological issues are a matter of the logic of justification (1966, p. 5) . The philosophy of the social sciences is distinguished by its focus on methodological issues in the social sciences (1966, p. 4) . Rudner was thus a proponent of a value-free ideal and his work on the social sciences aimed to fulfill that ideal.
Nor was value-laden philosophical work relegated to the sub-program "Sociology" (see below).
From a total of 219 research grants that were awarded in the sociological sciences over the period [1958] [1959] [1960] [1961] [1962] [1963] 7 pertain to a project the title of which suggests an engagement with science, broadly conceived, as a social activity: "The Acceptance of Innovation" (Russell L. Langworthy, 1960), "Factors in scientific performance" (Donald C Pelz, 1961 , "Automation and the Community" (William A. Faunce, 1962) , "The impact of technological change" (Fred Cottrell, 1963) , and "Patterns of scientific collaboration" (Robert K. Merton, 1963) . However, the awardees of these projects were sociologists and psychologists, whose work, with the exception of the work of Robert K. Merton, does not appear in the Philosopher's Index. Apparently, although the NSF supported some work in the sociology of science, it neglected philosophical approaches to this field of study.
In sum, the NSF's funding records and the publication records of the scholars that obtained NSF funding suggest that HPS, from its inception until at least 1963, almost exclusively supported valuefree philosophy of science.
4. An explanation of the NSF's support for value-free philosophies of science 18 I.e., Scanlon 1972. 19 I.e., Schick 1966; Cocchiarella 1969a , 1969b , Corcoran 1971 Corcoran and Herring 1972. Why did NSF funds, during the period 1958-1963, go almost exclusively to value-free philosophy of science? The present section suggests that this was, to a considerable extent, the immediate result of the promotion of such philosophy by philosophers of science who were committed to it and served as advisors in the HPS sub-program.
The main reason for thinking that philosophers of science were, to no small extent, responsible for promoting value-free philosophy is that, since its founding in 1950, the NSF awarded research money primarily through competitive peer review, a process in which grant applications were, per program, assessed by advisory panels and/or external referees (England 1982, p. 173; Mazuzan 1992, p. 67) . Members on the advisory panels reviewed applications themselves, or helped to coordinate the out-house review process (England 1982, p. 262, 358 ) (and may also have provided suggestions about who should sit on future advisory panels). Subsequently, program directors asked for final approval of the decisions made within their program.
The role of advisors might have been particularly large at the HPS sub-program (at least in the period we are concerned with). In the first four years, there was one director for the entire Social Science program, which comprised, in addition to the HPS sub-program, the sub-programs "Anthropology", "Economy" and "Sociology". The respective directors, Henry W. Riecken (1958 Riecken ( -1959 and Albert Spaulding (1960 Spaulding ( -1961 , did not have a background in philosophy (Riecken obtained a PhD in the behavioral sciences, Spaulding in archaeology); they thus may have had to rely in an especially heavy way on the advice of the philosophers in the advisory panel of the program. In 1962, Roger C. Buck became the first director who was solely responsible for the HPS sub-program.
Although Buck had training in philosophy, his publication record in the Philosopher's Index (one publication before 1962, which contained a value-free analysis of clinical insight in psychology)
suggests that he was not yet a prominent philosopher of science. 20 Since the philosophers in the 13 advisory panels were much more established than he was (see below), Buck too might have had to rely in a particularly heavy way on their advice.
Let us now look at the metaphilosophical commitments of these philosopher-advisors. Ernest Nagel (panel member in 1958 and acknowledges that understanding science requires investigating its institutions. However, he adds that if science is to be understood, "the types and the articulation of scientific statements, as well as the logic by which scientific conclusions are established, also require careful analysis. This is a task -a major if not exclusive task -that the philosophy of science undertakes to execute" (Nagel 1961, p. 15) . Thus, Nagel inclines towards the view that all there is to the philosophy of science is logical analysis, even if he does not firmly state a commitment to this view. When he goes on to examine science, his focus is on the logic of science.
While he does consider whether non-epistemic values have a role in science, he does so only in examining whether they necessarily make objective conclusions in the social sciences impossible (1961, pp. 485-502) .
Max Black (panel member in 1960 and 1961) is also committed to value-free philosophy of science. Black's focus throughout his career is on conceptual clarification or, as he called it, "the articulation of concepts" (Schrader 2005 ). In particular, his work in the philosophy of science does not engage with political, moral or societal issues, but rather centers on conceptual issues in the philosophy of mathematics (see, e.g., Black 1942 ) and on problems relating to induction (see, e.g., the exchange between Black and Wesley Salmon; see Salmon 1957 and Black 1959) . And Black's response to the worry that there is more to philosophy than clarity is that "it will be time enough to worry about that when clarity is generally valued more highly than mystification" (1950, p. v).
Black's metaphilosophy is thus clearly at odds with value-laden approaches to the philosophy of science.
Sidney Morgenbesser (panel member in 1962 and tells us that what constitutes a philosophy of science is, in addition to the provision of an understanding of the aims of science, an analysis of its key terms, an analysis of the key terms used to discuss its theories and the elucidation of specific scientific theories (Morgenbesser 1967, p. xi What adds to the suspicion that the philosophy advisors were the immediate causes of the pattern described in the previous section is that there were alternatives to value-free philosophy of science. Howard (2003, pp. 66-70) shows that the journal Philosophy of Science gave substantial space to value-laden philosophy of science during the 1950s; indeed, the examples provided above of valueladen philosophy of science are mostly drawn from this journal. So too, Deweyan pragmatism was an important source of value-laden philosophy of science and still had, contrary to Giere (1996) 22 See e.g., Axinn 1954; Benjamin 1965; Feuer 1963; Handy 1956 Handy , 1958 Harris 1969; Hook 1950 Hook , 1959 Kaminsky 1957; Kaminsky and Nelson 1958; Kennedy 1954; Kurtz 1955 Kurtz , 1956 Lavine 1950 Lavine , 1953 Miller 1947 Miller , 1959 Morris 1956 Morris , 1970 Riepe 1958; Ross 1963 Ross ,1965 Schmidt 1959; Sleeper 1960; Thayer 1951 Thayer , 1968 Wiener 1949 There are two complications for our story. First, the NSF's annual reports do not list rejected applications. So perhaps, one might think, socially engaged philosophers of science did not suffer from discrimination, simply because they did not apply for NSF funding. However, the incentives to apply were there: publication, and thus the incentive to free up time for research, became important to getting and keeping an academic job after the Second World War (Nee and Ingram 1998) , and university administrations appeared not to be insensitive to grantsmanship when it came to hiring faculty (Veatch 1997, p. 74, 94) . In light of such incentives, and in light of the fact that the NSF was, in the 1950s, by far the biggest source of external support for work in the philosophy of science, it would have made sense for socially engaged philosophers to try acquiring NSF research money. 23 Admittedly, socially engaged philosophers might have considered applying pointless, because they knew who panel members were and which approaches they favoured. In that case, the marginalization of value-laden approaches would still be an effect, albeit an indirect one, of HPS sub-program policies.
A second complication concerns our suggestion that Nagel, Black, Morgenbesser, Maxwell and such as generalizability and verifiability meaningfully apply to empirical studies but not to logical analysis (viz., the establishment of analytic truths). So, in some ways, philosophers who took themselves to be partly engaged in empirical research, e.g., those aiming at a descriptive, scientific ethics or those studying sociological aspects of the context of discovery, would at least appear to be better candidates for funding than the logical analysts. 24 Further, while the philosophy actually funded by the NSF by and large seems to have had to meet the narrower pre-1958 requirements of convergent research, research in other social sciences did not have to do so. In 1960, for example, NSF funded anthropology projects had titles such as "Acculturation among the Chippewa", "Culture Change in the Masai" and "Social Change in a Plural Society" (see also the titles given above for funded work in the sociology sub-program). All of this suggests that HPS sub-program panelists were more restrictive in what they deemed worthy of funding than NSF policies demanded of them, and thus that they could have done otherwise.
Interestingly, philosophers were also involved in the design phase of the HPS sub-program. In 1954, Alpert financed a meeting under the auspices of the American Philosophical Society, America's 19 first learned society, which was founded (Conklin 1937) which argued that the value of the philosophy of science lies primarily in its contributions to science rather than to broader societal issues and none of which linked such contributions to normative issues (Margenau 1955; Dingle 1955; Frank 1955 ; see also Shryock 1955) . So if NSF administrators were in need of (additional) arguments for the promotion of value-free philosophies of science, the presentations by Margenau, Dingle and Frank might have provided these. 
Explanations of the triumph of the value-free ideal
25 Some of Frank's work clearly goes against the value-free ideal (see Frank 1937) . Moreover, the support his presentation gives to this ideal is less straightforward than what is found in the presentations by Margenau and Dingle. Nevertheless, Frank's presentation is consistent with, and plausibly taken to support, the ideal. What he explicitly says about the role of philosophy of science is that it investigates the rules about how concepts and facts interact and that its business is "to present and analyze the changing conceptual system of science" (1955, p. 350) . He does go on to state that science should be studied not only from a logical and empirical perspective but also with an eye towards the extra-scientific factors in the formation of concepts. But he does this in the context of discussing the functions of history, philosophy and the sociology of science; he does not state that philosophy itself studies extra-scientific factors (1955, p. 351) . Moreover, some of what he says regarding extra-scientific factors suggests that their study belongs to history, psychology and sociology. He writes that, if a student is to understand the formula, f=ma, its logical and empirical aspects will have to be explained as well as "the historical psychological and sociological background from which the formula has emerged" (1955 p. 351).
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There are a variety of explanations for the loss of influence of value-laden approaches. In what follows, we review these explanations and discuss how they relate to the observations made above.
Reisch ( (named after its originator Raymond B. Allen), a formula that, among other things, was designed to fire communist faculty members and that was implemented throughout the U.S. Solovey (2013, pp. 150-163) points to another potential political influence on the start of the development of the HPS in the first half of the 1950s, namely the already mentioned attacks on the social sciences by conservative politicians who thought that these sciences were tainted by left-wing ideology.
Edgar (2009) though, that this sense of professionalization helps to explain the depoliticization of work in the philosophy of science. According to Edgar, philosophies of science that promoted liberalism, of the kind endorsed for instance by the pragmatist, anti-communist Sidney Hook, did not remain mainstream despite the fact that they were valued. We agree that some stakeholders valued some of the normative work produced by Hook, as well as some of the related work of Lewis S. Feuer, who transitioned to anti-communism after the second world war (Feuer 1988, pp. 28-29) . But, as Solovey emphasizes, some NSF administrators aimed to maintain a sharp boundary between science and politics (2013, p. 154) ; at least at the NSF, normative philosophy of science might not have been welcomed. 26 Nevertheless, it is at least unclear why value-free philosophy of science would be more valued by institutional supporters than descriptive, value-laden philosophy of science. In the case of the NSF, for example, we have seen that it was far from obvious that descriptive value-laden philosophy of science was less likely to meet the NSF's standards (viz. generalizability, verifiability and objectivity).
Additionally, Edgar discusses a second sense of professionalization, one that he thinks did contribute to depoliticization. Professionalization is accompanied by specialization and is defined by the abstract theory which informs it. Accordingly, philosophy of science underwent a wave of professionalization during the 1950s, in the sense that its framework became consolidated around what one could broadly conceive of as logical analysis (e.g., analysis of terms such as, explanation, probable inference, causality, measurement). Logical analysis determined the boundaries of what was and what was not philosophy of science, and, more particularly, set philosophy of science apart from investigations which previously would fall under its heading, such as historical, sociological, psychological and moral investigations of science.
Our study points to another factor behind the loss of ground by value-laden philosophy of science:
value-free philosophers probably used institutional control of the HPS sub-program to promote valuefree approaches at the expense of value-laden ones. They did so in the period we have been concerned with (1958) (1959) (1960) (1961) (1962) (1963) ; and, given who sat on later advisory panels, it is not unreasonable to think that 26 Capps (2003) provides another criticism of Edgar, one that might be thought to undermine the use of Hook's work as an example of pragmatist philosophy of science. Hook (1952) argues for the exclusion of communists from academia.
His argument, according to Capps (2003, p. 73) , is in the style of analytic philosophy because it emphasizes definitions, generality and logical deduction, as opposed to earlier pragmatists' emphasis on the context sensitivity of arguments. As a result, Capps claims, it is not clear what practical difference Hook's pragmatism makes to his argument. Capps, however, provides no evidence for thinking that pragmatists were ever committed to the view that their pragmatism had to manifest itself directly in each of their arguments. Moreover, Hook provides clear statements of his commitment to pragmatism as well as of how it informs his anti-communist stance (see, e.g., Hook 1956 ). In any case, what matters most in the present context is just that Hook was engaged in value-laden philosophy of science and, in this respect, provides an alternative to value-free philosophy of science.
they did so throughout the 1960s. 27 In all likelihood, this would have boosted the publication numbers of those producing value-free philosophy of science and, partly as a result and partly because of the prestige of the NSF, enhanced their prestige. Overall, these philosophers would have had a substantial advantage on the job market at a time (Katzav 2018, Katzav and Vaesen 2017b) when philosophy was growing rapidly. Thus, the continued marginalization of value-laden approaches at the NSF likely was one of the factors that contributed to philosophy of science's withdrawal from social concerns.
Rudner 
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required by politics also indicates that politics was not sufficient to bring about either the HPS policies or the broader marginalization of value-laden philosophy of science.
Similarly, given that many philosophers of science were still working on value-laden philosophy of science in the 1950s, and that key institutions such as Philosophy of Science and The Journal of Philosophy, were run by those who considered value-laden philosophy of science legitimate, it seems that marginalization is better thought of as driving, rather than as being driven by, the adoption of the logical empiricist framework by American philosophy of science. This is just to say that, contrary to Edgar, marginalization is a cause of, rather than is caused by, what counts as professionalization in the second of the senses of "professionalization" that he introduces -that is, professionalization conceived of as the adoption of a theoretical framework by a field of research. 29 Further, our account suggests that analytic philosophers were simply more successful than pragmatists in acquiring important positions at the NSF. Once they had acquired these positions, they treated their own standards as standards for the entire profession, and saw to it that work fitting these standards was promoted. Several factors, none of them having to do with professionalization (in the second of the senses used by Edgar), may have contributed to the success of analytic philosophers at gaining a foothold at the HPS sub-program. Analytic philosophers, for example, might have been better at selling their work as scientific. Additionally, the philosophers in the steering committee of the meeting in which HPS was prepared (viz. Margenau and Frank) were also physicists; that perhaps made them less suspect in the eyes of the many NSF natural scientists who had their doubts about the scientific standing of the social sciences.
In keeping with NSF administrators' plans for the Social Science Program, it was, Solovey (2013, pp. 170-171) suggests, primarily scientific research that appeared to meet universal scientific 29 We have our reservations about this characterization of professionalization. It makes professionalization dependent on the emergence of a dominant paradigm within a discipline, and thus implies, in our opinion infelicitously, that methodological pluralism reduces a discipline's degree of professionalization. We do not want to pursue this any further, though, given that it is tangential to the main point we want to make here.
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standards that received funding during the relevant period. With regard to the philosophy of science, Solovey concludes, albeit on the basis of just a couple of examples, that funding primarily went to studies concerning the natural sciences. This conclusion is thus consistent with the one argued for here. At the same time, ours is inferred from a much more systematic analysis of NSF's funding records and is broader in scope: funded projects did not just concern the natural sciences, they approached the natural sciences in a way that avoided addressing non-cognitive value questions. We also noted a contrast between the narrow focus of philosophy projects on convergent research and the broader focus of some of the other areas of research funded by the social sciences program. Finally, whereas Solovey identifies NSF administrators as the primary force in promoting the value-free ideal, our study suggests that philosophers, as it comes to the philosophy of science, also had a significant role in promoting that ideal.
Discussion
The evidence provided above suggests that philosophers sympathetic to logical empiricism used the Previous studies of the way analytic philosophers used institutional control to their advantage have focused on their control of key journals. While our study allows us to surmise that analytic philosophers also used the control of funding in order to marginalize non-analytic philosophy, we have not shown that the NSF only funded logical empiricist, and thus analytic, philosophy of science.
The titles of NSF funded projects, and our search of related subsequent publications, only allow us to say that the projects were almost entirely value-free not that they almost entirely relied on logical analysis or other methodologies that might have been acceptable to analytic philosophers. But, given the logical empiricist background of the advisors, it seems plausible to suppose that they almost exclusively funded work in the logical empiricist spirit and thus that fit neatly into the mould of analytic philosophy. Here too, it seems, analytic philosophy was operating to marginalize nonanalytic philosophy. Indeed, pragmatists and other non-analytic philosophers do feature prominently among those who did not receive NSF funding. suggested by the fact that the voices of some philosophers of science who were concerned with value-27 laden issues were not heard as loudly as they might have been heard. These issues are now once again perceived as being important issues within the philosophy of science.
